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Maik Arnold
Religion as Experience: An Interpretative Approach 
to Cultural Psychology of Religion
Introduction: The Concept o f‘Religion as Experience’
The term ‘religion as experience’ is understood here as the core of a meaning- 
making process and is presented in the form of an interpretative approach which 
is empirically grounded on symbolic action theory (cf. Boesch, 1991) and cul­
tural psychology of religion (cf. Belzen, 2010). This methodological and theo­
retical framework was developed as part of the author’s own empirical research 
on religious self-concepts in autobiographical narratives of German Protestants 
before, during, and after their involvement in religious missions (Arnold, 2010). 
This approach is inspired by the theoretically motivated studies in the philos­
ophy of religion of Matthias Jung (1999; 2005), and sociology of religion of Hans 
Joas (2002; 2004), although in some important respects there is a need to go 
beyond their underlying argumentation, especially in the case of analysing the 
meanings of cultural actions in the process of interpreting lived experiences. 
Culture is referred to in this chapter as a “social, knowledge-based, symbolically 
imparted practice” (Straub, 2006, p. 174). This approach guides us -  when 
studying religion, religiosity, and spirituality in everyday life -  from a psycho­
logical perspective. It takes into account that the modes of description of un­
derlying social, science-based concepts vary with regard to the social contexts, 
practices, and formulation of questions for research on religion. Likewise, no 
form of explanation can ultimately avoid reductions and schematisations either 
of the complex reality of experiences or the process of their formation and 
acquisition by human individuals. In view of this, this chapter argues for the 
integration and meaningful relation of a multiplicity of epistemological, theo­
retical, methodological, and practical aspects of empirical research on religion. 
Our concept has the ability to overcome the limitations of strategies of homo­
geneity (i. e. negation of differences), and thus is able to keep in mind precarious 
tensions, mutual incommensurability, and reductionisms.
In this context, the frequently used term, ‘experience’, is based on a holistic 
concept that involves cognitive assumption of facts as ‘true’, as well as personal
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attitudes and affective conditions (such as states of great emotion and aston­
ishment) -  all the while remaining indissolubly linked to a practical and com­
municative approach to the individual self in its social environment (cf. Joas, 
2004, p. 66; Jung, 1999, p. 264). Experiences are embedded in actions, which 
allow us to relate the quality of (religious) experiences to specific capabilities of 
articulation, and modes of expression. For such a pragmatic perspective we 
need, on the one hand, to distinguish between the primary (subjective) quality of 
lived experience and the closely related ‘creative’ performance of meaning- 
formation (cf. i.e. Joas, 2002). On the other hand, it is impossible to consider 
expression-formation (Ausdrucksbildung) and understanding of sense (Sinn­
verstehen) seperately (Jung, 2005, p. 242; trans. MA), since every capacity for 
articulation is always interlinked with cultural and religious symbolic systems of 
beliefs, as well as their interpretation (or ‘re-interpretation’). Such a holistic and 
integrative concept of experience is picked up within the complex and over­
arching structure of a ‘spider’s web’ in which multidimensional relations -  
which can neither be considered independently nor defined only with regard to 
their place in the (whole) ensemble -  exist between the single constituents. 
Experiences and actions, articulations and interpretations, are integrated into/ 
within this multidimensional and polyvalent, reciprocal and pragma-semantic 
“network ofinterwoven and inter-definable terms” (Straub, 2006, p. 173) or “web 
of meaning-making activities” (Valsiner & Veen, 2000, p. 18).
This web of connotations and denotations goes beyond the suggested her­
meneutic approach of experience-formation in form of a tripartite relationship 
between “(lived) experience-expression-understanding” (Erlebnis-Ausdruck- 
Verstehen; cf. Jung, 1999, p. 36; trans. MA) as described in the later work of 
Wilhelm Dilthey. The individual’s lived experiences are part of the system of 
“objective apprehension” (objektiver Geist; cf. Dilthey, 2002, p. 58; trans. MA) 
and are irreducible components in the process “understanding” (Verstehen; cf. 
Matthes, 1992). With regard to the terminology referred to here, the experience- 
formation process distinguishes between two interwoven levels of the inter­
pretation of experiences (see Figure 1): a subjective perspective (inner circle), on 
the one hand, and an intersubjective perspective (outer circle) on the other. A 
transformation between these different levels is realized by the ‘articulation’ of 
the subject’s meaningful experiences. Thus, an interpretative cultural psychol­
ogy of religion is described in this chapter in two parts: firstly, the basic concepts 
and components; secondly, the methodological approach.
First, we focus on the complex interplay between experiences and actions, 
expectations and unexpected events. Attention is given to the concept of artic­
ulation, the process of making one’s own experiences, and to the relevance of 
communicative action. A subject-oriented approach to an individual’s meaning- 
making process is regularly confronted with the problem that not every in­
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dividual experience, or the singularity thereof, can be fully apprehended by 
appropriate language. However, language equips humans with the ability to 
articulate precarious tensions between the ‘sayable’ and the ‘unsayable’.
Figure 1 : Basic concepts and terminology of an interpretative approach empirically grounded on 
symbolic action theory and cultural psychology of religion (Source: illustration from author)
In addition, our discussion not only needs to consider the perspective of the 
‘first person’ singular or plural, but also the sequential structure of the experi- 
ence-formation process. This process starts with a qualitative experience and 
ends with the interpretation of its meanings in the course of articulation. Con- 
versly, collectively shared and culturally determined patterns of meanings, 
symbols, and articulatory expressions determine the making of experiences. 
Consequently, the articulation of experiences in the context of religion requires a 
specific cultural technique: story telling, in form of (auto-) biographical nar­
rations, as a mode of ‘self-thematization’.
Second, we draw attention to the underlying methodical and methodological 
consequences for an interpretative cultural psychology of religion, starting with 
an outline of the problem of reductionism in the research of religion, and fin­
42 Maik Arnold
ishing with a description of a comparative analysis which attempts to identify, 
explain, and interpret types of experiences based on methodical empiricism and 
knowledge-formation in cultural psychology.
Basic Concepts, Components, and Terminology of an Interpretative 
Psychology of Religion
Relationships between Experience and Action, Expectation and Events
‘Experience’ and ‘action’ are not to be understood as disjunctive but as com­
plementary categories. With the inclusion of perspectives from symbolic action 
theory in an experience theoretical framework, it should be possible to over­
come the dualistic differentiation between activity and passivity in experience 
and action. As Jung (2005) has pointed out, with the dualistic concept in John 
Dewey’s (1896, p. 359) essay “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology”, it could be 
argued instead that both terms need to be embedded in an overall structure with 
relational character: actions are not single entities, or inseparable creative 
outputs of human experiences, but rather action go into experiences and vice­
versa. Dewey (1896, p. 358) aptly clarifies the structural aspect of the relation 
between experience and action with regard to observations of the human 
physical organism. According to him, all human behavior is an interaction of 
both the receptive moment of a stimulus and the spontaneous quality of a 
reaction to that stimulus (Jung, 2005, p. 234). According to Dewey (1896, p. 358), 
a reaction, in the context of experience-formation, is “the so-called response 
(...)  not merely to the stimulus; it is into it.” Within this pragmatic approach, 
this means that human action is not just a response to an experience, but that 
experience is also an action, which finds its way into the everyday world in the 
course of its occurrence. Consequently, in confronting its environment the ex­
periencing self cannot do anything other than react. Therefore, on the basis of 
this relationship between experiences and actions, we can infer that a receptive 
and a spontaneous perspective of the self and its relation to the world are dif­
ferent “characteristic phases that remain in contrast to each other” (Jung, 2005, 
p. 243 ; trans. MA) and cannot be assumed to be disjunctive sequences of the 
process of experience- and knowledge-formation, as is usually assumed in 
theories of perception. Any attempt to merge human experience with such an 
empirical concept of perception inevitably leads to an unsubstantiated reduction 
of social reality (Alston, 1993, p. 186). First, theories of perception obscure the 
fact that, besides the content of religious experiences, acting subjects are 
themselves involved in the practical application of convictions and orientations
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in ritual practice. Second, such theories also neglect the fact that experience is 
always regarded in a process-oriented “interdependence between lived experi­
ences and the search for expressions” (Jung, 2005, p. 244) in which the entire 
existence of an ‘I’, acting in its life-world -  perceiving, thinking, feeling, fanta­
sizing, wishing, and remembering -  is embedded.
As Ulrike Popp-Baier (2006, p. 141) emphasizes, the process of experience- 
formation always involves a combination of expectation, action, and “un­
expected events” (Widerfahren). We can draw at least two implications from a 
pragmatic perspective on the ‘I-to-world’ relationship. First, on the basis of 
particular cognitive and emotional (affective) expectations and attitudes, which 
can be either met or disappointed, an individual is able to gain experiences. 
Generally, from an inside perspective, shared willingness, agreement, and belief 
in the semantic content of expressions (which also to some extent perform the 
perception) is necessary if we are to have experiences. Furthermore, it is nec­
essary to consider typical, culturally shared meanings and forms of expression 
that can only be determined in the action and during such “semanticized 
practices that require an inner commitment to its semantic content” (Jung, 2005, 
p. 244; emphasis in original; trans. MA).
Second, in relation to the terms expectation and action it is also of paramount 
importance here that not every (generally human) behavior is predictable. As 
Niklas Luhmann (1971, p. 41) stated, individuals frequently encounter limi­
tations while making experiences. Unexpected events and incidents surprise 
them or disappoint their expectations and interests. The experiencing ‘I’ is 
challenged to perceive what has happened, reflecting and interpreting its lived 
experiences, and making new experiences in the meantime. However, expect­
ations are not inevitably disappointed in the making of experiences. What is 
more, it is also possible that through surprise and evidence which does not 
conform to expectation, conscious experience comes to be. In this sense, it can 
be concluded that our continuous exposure to the ‘intangible’ and ‘unavailable’, 
which we experience without actively doing anything (e. g. independent of our 
thinking, desiring, feeling, and action), is an anthropological constant. This has 
psychic implications for the persons affected, restricting or extending their 
facilities for action, marking specific moments in their life stories, or leaving a 
typeable “trajectory of life events” (Verlaufskurven; cf. Schütze, 1983, p. 288). 
Furthermore, the process of experience-formation includes the fact that subjects 
thematize and articulate their lived experiences in a specific manner, and that 
articulation is confronted with the basic obstacle of language.
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The Problem of Articulation in the Process of Experiences-Formation
In linguistic terms, ‘articulation’ has usually been understood merely as a cat­
egory which primarily emphasizes the desire “to (adequately) express oneself.” 
According to this meaning, ‘articulation’ refers to vocalization and the precision 
of pronunciation in terms of phonetics (cf. Weisgerber, 1971). However, this 
usage of the term misses one particular aspect: namely, that articulation involves 
both a phonetic and a mental quality, which are responsible for expressive 
diversity. Joas (2002, p. 507) approaches the “problem of articulation” from a 
pragmatist and social theoretical perspective while considering the “necessary 
tension between the sayable and unsayable”, asking whether it “is indeed ob­
solete and naive -  or whether this idea -  what I call ‘the problem of articulation’ -  
can lead us any further.” To answer this question he refers to the central problem 
of (analytical) philosophy of language in the twentieth century, which is based on 
the assumption that language is a characteristic of almost every human per­
ception and schematization of reality. In the effort to develop a solution to this 
problem, Joas discusses Cornelius Castoriadis’ essay “The Sayable and the Un- 
sayable” (1984).
In his essay, Castoriadis (1984), being interested in a ‘post-phenomeno­
logical’ conception of language, meditates on the late philosophical work of the 
French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the model of language 
essential to his philosophy of consciousness. Castoriadis’ reflection on Merleau- 
Ponty’s Phenomenology o f  Perception (1968) is an attempt to preserve the fun­
damental premises of a language-theoretical tradition in philosophy -  such as a 
concept of experience as “always already mediated through prior under­
standing, so that we can never reach unschematized, non-linguistic ‘pure’ ex­
perience” (Joas, 2002, p. 506). At the same time, however, certain premises in the 
philosophy of consciousness need to be overcome, such as the assumption that 
mental consciousness is the starting-point of human perception, “that becomes 
only secondarily translated into language” (Joas, 2002, p. 507). Castoriadis 
(1984) rejects this position of a “pre-linguistic conditionality” of human con­
sciousness out of hand. For him, language is nothing but a secondary trans­
formation and translation of the “relationship between the consciousness and 
the world” (Joas, 2002, p. 507). In order to explore all possibilities for getting to 
the root of the problem, the relationship between language and its expression, 
Joas (2002, p. 509) states that the “idea of ‘expression’ in the sense of a pre- 
linguistically constituted meaning, which only secondarily becomes translated 
into language, is clearly overcome; but it is not replaced by the image of a closed 
set of linguistic meanings forming a finite repertory for the possibilities of 
experiences.”
This interpretation of Castoriadis’ idea of visibility and invisibility is also the
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basis of our experience-theoretical considerations. Castoriadis (1984) deals with 
the principal problem of how new things can be created by language if we assume 
that human experience is primarily based on a limited capacity for articulations. 
We must not think of a concept of articulation as an exclusive act of “re­
combination” (Joas) ofprevious thoughts, feelings, and actions. As such itwould 
remain incomplete. ‘Expression’ is not merely determined by language, although 
language is a “privileged mode” of our “organization of the world” (Castoriadis, 
1984, p. 123). In addition, the articulatory process is also influenced by various 
intentions of action, attitudes, and expectations. Conversely, symbolic ex­
pressions determine the diversity of meanings and the meaning-making proc­
ess. But not everything that is intended to express is actually an expression. The 
use of language is always a struggle for expression, whereby the tension between 
what could be said (the primary intention or consciousness of an expression) 
and what is sayable, but has not yet been formulated (the secondary formation of 
an expression by use of language), cannot be completely resolved. If we were to 
content ourselves without a reference to the pre-linguistic origin of the ‘sayable’, 
we would have to finish our deliberations here with an imagination of a com­
pletely closed process of experience-formation, mediating between language 
and expression.
Another perspective is the thematization of social, cultural, practical, ev­
eryday experiences. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in articulations of 
experiences we can also trace prior attempts at articulation. If we accept this we 
can argue with Castoriadis (1984), and also with William James (1902), that in 
the process of articulation an individual makes use of the richness of a complex, 
culturally preformed repertoire of (linguistic) expressions. Every articulating 
and experiencing subject has the opportunity to choose between different 
available and selectable alternatives of expressions, and is able to create new 
expressions to add to, differentiate, and expand that repertoire (e. g. neo­
logisms). The non-identity of the repertoire of linguistic expressions with the 
lived experience in need of articulation will neither be relativized nor naturally 
disappear. Neither the articulatory repertoire nor human experience is qual­
itatively or quantitatively determined by the subjects’ capacities and possibil­
ities of expressions, but are always culturally formed and shaped by individual 
biography.
According to Castoriadis (1984, pp. 129 -130), we can summarize the results 
of our analysis as follows. The original idea of an expression is not always visible 
to us; we can, nevertheless, identify and observe the implications and effects of 
how new meanings are created. In the process of experience-formation inter­
dependencies exist between subjective experiences, qualities of lived experi­
ences, individual articulations, and the available finite repertoire of culturally 
preformed and determined linguistic expressions and interpretations (cf. Joas,
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2002; Jung, 1999). In such use ofverbal expressions specific, cultural experiences 
of difference, otherness, and alterity are elucidated, and common patterns of 
articulation are reproduced. In this regard, culture functions as a system of 
meanings, symbols, and orientations to life. In the process of interpreting lived 
experiences, or rather transformations and translations of qualities into ex­
pression, the question also arises of its meaning for the individual, who is 
continuously trying to achieve consonance and coherence between reflected 
experiences and his or her self and worldview.
These relations between experience and its cultural meanings will serve to 
evaluate the tension between the sayable and the unsayable, and imply various 
consequences with regard to the concept/notion ofarticulation as it is used here. 
Although it is not possible to present these implications in detail (for an over­
view cf. Arnold, 2010, pp. 70-76), we can make two observations. First, the 
tension between pre-linguistic intuition and the available repertoire oflinguistic 
expressions does not exist per se but can be articulated by means of language -  
although not with complete success or sufficient quality. Second, there ist a 
reciprocal relationship of interpretation between experience and articulation. 
Therefore, the experience-formation process becomes an on-going process of 
the formation of expressions (through language), on the basis of available 
meanings, or the recreation of new expressions to develop and expand the 
repertoire of possible expressions by individuals. Thus, the meaningful articu­
lations of individuals’ subjective qualities of lived experiences need to be ana­
lyzed from a ‘first-hand perspective’, and, thereafter, the relation between the 
quality of lived experiences and articulatory meaning-making.
Subjective Experience from a First-Hand Perspective
Experiences do not immediately become tangible to us, and cannot simply be 
made. They provide a subject-oriented approach to exploring one’s own self in 
the social scene (Boesch, 1991). In paying attention to the self-concept and 
relationship to the world from the “first-hand perspective” of an individual, we 
take into consideration that the “conscious life ofevery individual has to be lived 
unjustifiably as one’s own” (Jung, 1999, p. 268; trans. MA). A starting-point for a 
thematization of the first-hand relationship of the experiencing subject to its 
environment is provided in the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), Paul 
Ricreur (1991) and Niklas Luhmann (1971), who all understand ‘experience’ as a 
“complexly structured first-hand relationship to the world” (Popp-Baier, 2006, 
p. 141; trans. MA).
In addition, analytical philosophy has investigated the epistemological ref­
erence to the “first person” (singular and plural) under the aspect of “privileged
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access” (cf. Alston, 1971; Nagel, 1974). It is common sense that individuals have 
particular access to their own inner psychic being (thoughts, perceptions, 
feelings, dispositions, etc.). Not only the formal structure of the privileged access 
to the subject’s perspective, but also the preferred mode of this access to par­
ticular mental states is still in need of explanation (cf. Jung, 1999). Instead of 
taking the (descriptive) knowledge that “a person has of his own mental (psy­
chological) states, such as thoughts and feelings” (Alston, 1971, p. 223) for 
granted we should speak of capacities for “articulation” (Jung, 1999, p. 272) in 
order to better respect the subjects’ first-hand experiences. Nevertheless, in the 
transformation of a description into an articulation, the interpretative tensions 
between articulation and claims to universal validity -  like those of religions and 
philosophies of life -  should remain intact (Jung, 1999, p. 287). However, ar­
ticulation should not be misunderstood as a naive representation of a subject’s 
inner world (cf. Taylor, 1980).
According to Jung (1999, pp. 290-291; trans. MA), descriptions can be il­
lustrated by the metaphor o f‘seeking’ a possible expression ofthe sayable, while 
the term ‘articulation’ refers to both the metaphors o f‘seeking’ and ‘generating’ 
meaningful expressions. In this regard, we assume a meaning-making process in 
which a selection of particular forms of expression for lived experience occurs 
under the exclusion of a multitude of alternative interpretations. The choice of 
specific expression-formation is, therefore, an interpretation of the subjective 
content of lived experience, which cannot be reduced to the first-hand per­
spective. As Jung (1999, p. 291 trans. MA) notes, choosing a particular form of 
expression integrates (at least) two interlocking levels (cf. Figure 1): “schemata 
of objectification” (e.g. identification with religion) and “schemata of sub- 
jectification” (individuals’ horizon of experiences). Therefore, at the center of 
studies of religion is an individual who relates their subjective experiences, and 
the content of these lived experiences, by simultaneously using their cultural 
repertoire of symbols, interpretations, and expressions, while either subsuming 
the cultural repertoire under their own lived experience or creating a new ex­
pression through reflection.
This means, however, that in a scientific study of religion perspectives of the 
first person singular and plural cannot be simply reduced to the supposedly 
neutral position of an uninvolved ‘third person’, nor can they merge with the 
latter. The concept of a neutral scientist seeking objectivity (from the perspective 
of the third person) does not take into account the fact that particular qualitative 
contents of lived experience are not objectifiable, since they cannot be repre­
sented other than from the perspective of the first person (cf. Nagel, 1980). 
Therefore, the process of scientific experience acquisition and knowledge-for­
mation needs to include expectations and attitudes as well as implicit and ex­
plicit knowledge (deriving from the cultural background of the experiencing
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subjects under investigation), and not only the knowledge of the scholars par­
ticipating in (textual) interpretation. In the scientific process of experience- 
formation, the existential singularity of religious interpretation is closely related 
to the conditions of the everyday life world, and the verbalizations of social and 
cultural practices. Thus, an articulation that refers to the social and cultural life 
world cannot avoid the theoretical perspectives of symbolic action theory.
Quality of Lived Experience and Articulatory Meaning
Generally, the philosophical term ‘articulation’ subsumes a relation between ‘the 
whole’ and its ‘structure’. In his famous Abhandlungen zur Grundlegung der 
Geisteswissenschaften (1924/1957: Xcvi), Wilhelm Dilthey references Immanuel 
Kant, emphasizing the dynamically developing and differentiating structure and 
organisation of the whole, in the relation “(lived)experience-expression-un- 
derstanding”. As will be shown in the following, from Dilthey’s (1924/1957) 
expression, “lived experience”, and Dewey’s (1896) concept of the “quality of 
lived experience”, we can elaborate a pragmatist perspective for the concept of 
articulation. The subject’s individual experience is thereby regarded as a core 
element of the experience-formation process.
Experience is not only the main focus of Dilthey’s relational model, but also 
constitutes an interface between the individual ability to form expressions and 
the available cultural repertoire of meaningful interpretations (Jung, 1999, p. 
290). According to Dilthey, it is the particular relationship between lived expe­
rience and expression that underscores the concept/notion of articulation. The 
representation of lived experience becomes possible, owing to a shared cultural 
horizon of expectations and a corresponding culturally preformed structure of 
experiences of individuals, as well as to the knowledge of common forms of 
expression. Thus, experiencing is the process “in which the quality of lived 
experience is determined from the meaning of articulation and, vice versa, the 
phenomenal determination of the self is also qualitatively characterized by ar­
ticulated values, norms, etc. themselves” (Jung, 2005, p. 245; trans. MA). It is 
especially through articulation that the subjective interpretation of the meaning 
of life becomes possible, whereby the individual makes accessible the qualitative 
content of lived experience by means and reference to a shared cultural system of 
action, orientation, and symbols. The experience-formation process is charac­
terized by the fact that the articulatory process of the understanding of sense, 
and the opening up of new meanings based on subjective experiences, are two 
inseparably linked elements (Joas, 2004, p. 24): religions, religious traditions, 
and institutions provide individuals with a rich repertoire of cultural symbols 
and patterns of interpretation, out of which an experiencing subject borrows
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patterns of interpretation for his/her lived experiences, in order to seek a suit­
able expression for the specific quality of the lived experience at hand. The lived 
experiences articulated by believers are not independent of the cultural reper­
toire. Moreover, individual and collective experiences and beliefs are indis­
solubly, interdependently, and dynamically related to each other.
Thus, cultural patterns of interpretation make it possible for believers to make 
particular experiences, which they then classify as religious : e. g. prayer, sac­
ramental experiences. During such activities, a person has religious or mystical 
experiences, owing not only to familiarity with patterns of interpretation of 
ritual practices, but also to the accessibility of such experiences from the first­
person perspective. Due to the the generation of individual interpretations of 
existing symbolic patterns of articulation, the qualitative content of the inter­
pretation of religious experiences can be explained, and a process of the un­
derstanding of sense starts. In a way, this is also a prerequisite for the inter­
subjective transparency and validity of individual experience. As has stated 
above, experience and articulation cannot be separated from each other.
Assuming this structural limitation of a concept of lived experience, in the 
next step we will not be able to ask, in a Diltheyian sense (determined by 
expression), how an orientation to action could develop from this concept.
Since Dilthey does not help us to answer this question, we will refer to 
Dewey’s essay, “Qualitative Thought” (1930), which clarifies the sequential 
structure of experience-formation, beginning with a qualitative experience and 
ending with an articulation of meaning (Jung, 2005, p. 246). According to Dewey, 
we cannot take the actual ‘existence’ of qualitative experiences as a starting- 
point and conclusions can only be inferred from the fact that lived experience, 
with a particular meaning for an individual, has been made and internalized. 
There is the “quality of a situation, but not existence itself” in the world of our 
experiences (Jung, 2005, p. 246; trans. MA). Inasmuch as qualitative experi­
encing is necessarily entangled in meaningful situations the lived experience 
becomes, so to speak, visible through an expression, pinpointing the inherent 
meaning. A conversation about the qualities of lived experiences becomes 
possible -  although meaning can vary from individual to individual -  because of 
a commonly shared descriptive vocabulary for articulation, and because the 
acting and articulating individual can extrapolate from a quality of lived expe­
riences, situations and particular contents of experiences. In this context, Dewey 
(1930, p. 254) speaks of a “given, total, persuasive quality” of an experienced 
situation. As a requirement, this discourse about the qualities of lived experi­
ences is only possible when the intended meaning of a situation is articulated 
from the first-person perspective. Conversely, in the articulatory meaning- 
making process, an individual always refers to the underlying cultural system of 
convictions, orientations, and symbols. Jung (2005, p. 247) also speaks, in this
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case, of a “creative translation between culturally preformed patterns of inter­
pretation and the qualitative act of life.” Between these two elements, which are 
sequentially related to each other in the experience-formation process (the 
“qualitative act of life” and the “cultural interpretation”), there is a lively in­
terdependency, the regularity of which empowers the individual self to develop 
and to change on the basis of everyday lived experiences.
This means that articulation takes place within the process of experience- 
formation, which is limited in two ways. On the one hand, in the process of 
understanding, the biographically stacked-up lived experiences presume a 
specific (culturally and symbolically preformed) horizon of interpretation in 
conjunction with the selected forms of expression. On the other hand, the va­
riety, variability, and infinitude of possible ways of articulation are limited, in 
reality, to the creative potentials of “selection, precision, clarification” (Jung, 
1999, p. 291; trans. MA). Language is not simply reproduced in expressions, 
since an experiencing subject in need of articulation is constantly seeking an 
expression appropriate to a quality of the lived experience on the basis of a 
culturally shared repertoire of expressions. In this case, the impetus from 
symbolic action theory lies in the naïve and reflective interpretation of a phe­
nomenon (Jung, 2005, p. 248): with an articulation of an intensive experience, an 
individual also attempts to understand the meaning of this experience and to 
find out the meaning of his/her lived life with reference to known interpretation. 
A newly arising perspective on life may guide individuals’ later action or, at least, 
lead to a change in the (creative) potential for action. As a result, different forms 
of development in biographically consistent and coherent personal identity are 
possible. Thus, in the process of articulation, seeking, finding, and creating 
meanings are closely linkedby means of cultural symbols and corresponding 
actions. In order to be able to articulate specific experiences, subjects usually 
make use of a particular expressive form and mode of ‘self-thematization’.
Articulation of Religious Experiences in (Auto-) Biographical Narratives
Experiences refer to an experiencing subject. They do not exist in an ‘empty 
space’ but take place in the world and in everyday life. According to the Aris­
totelian definition of experience (sipsipia), “everyday life experiences have to be 
understood as explicit foundations and frames of reference for all forms of 
knowledge formation” (Straub, 1989, p. 202; trans. MA). Everyday experiences 
are an important element of one’s own life story, which is also a history shared 
with other individuals. Major life events, in which an “I” locates itself, are partly 
predictable and partly unpredictable. Stories about life need to be understood 
and interpreted. The process and meaning of a life story is constructed by the
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variety of possible representations of one’s own experiences. The articulation of 
a life event and its reconstructed meaning always require a specific narrative 
form of expression, a narration.
In the process of experience-formation narrators become intuitively involved 
with their own life story, in story telling as an everyday communication practice, 
especially from the perspective of the first person (singular and plural).
In stories about everyday life, which follow particular rules, a person ex­
presses his or her own lived experiences. A violation of these rules can only 
happen at the expense of understanding and traceability, and may also lead to the 
loss of consistency and coherence. Different “compulsions of storytelling” (Zu­
gzwänge des Erzählens; Schütze, 1983; for an overview cf. Straub, 1989, p. 191) 
constantly guide the narrator. Nevertheless, the assumption of a homology be­
tween the constitution of stories and experiences has already been identified as a 
problem. Experiences are not simply retrievable or available at any time, but are 
already reflections of former lived experiences. Experiences once made can be 
overwritten and stacked up, not only via reflection, but also via other events, 
experiences, and narrations. Because all narrators tell their interesting and 
‘authentic’ self-stories to express and thematize their own point of view, life 
experiences cannot be investigated without regard for the situation and context 
in which they are narratively expressed, or the presumed expectations of the 
recipients.
Story Telling as a Mode of Self-Thematization
Story telling can be regarded as a widespread mode of ‘self-thematization’ (for 
an overview cf. Straub & Arnold, 2009). In life stories a person creates his or her 
own perspective on his or her life. Narrations are not simply reproductions of 
‘actual’ or ‘authentic’ experiences which ‘really’ occurred in the way depicted, 
but are reconstructions of moments of shifting life, and are only accessible as 
more or less appropriate ‘versions’ of the past. The thematization of one’s own 
life in stories depends on the narrators themselves, who act in the narration, or 
realize that something happened to them. An important and necessary condition 
is that they locate and position themselves on the basis of participation in a 
cultural practice.
The techniques and repertoire of storytelling, acquired during life, vary de­
pending on the culturally shared repertoire of traditional narratives, adapt­
ability to the life stories of significant others, and creativity in generating new 
stories about one’s own life. The constitution, formation, and interpretation of 
self-stories is not only a creative performance of the memory, but also locates 
and thematize the self in a socio-cultural context (e.g. Straub, 2008; Straub &
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Arnold, 2009). In self-stories a person not only remembers and evaluates what 
once happened, but also tells about future plans, notions of life, and whether 
their expectations and longings have been met or disappointed. Rational as­
sessments and conscious decisions go hand in hand with emotional fluctuations 
and moments of elation. Rational arguments can suddenly stand side by side 
with beliefs. Precarious tensions may emerge. On a pragmatic level, narrations 
guide, organize, and regulate human action.
Stories never represent the entire life history, spaces of experiences, and 
horizons of expectations of the story telling ‘I’, but are selectively reduced to 
verbal articulations, remaining unavoidably incomplete, whereby the per­
spective of time and space cannot be separated from the narrated content (Popp- 
Baier, 2009). As a matter of course, narrations can also consist of non-accessible 
or rarely accessible articulations and seemingly cognitively inaccessible ele­
ments of one’s own life story. Language, as a medium of articulation, makes it 
possible to express the tension between the ‘sayable’ and the ‘unsayable’ (Cas- 
toriadis, 1984), e. g. in meditations or prayers. In all cases, the narrator goes back 
in each description, explanation, and evaluation to (auto-) biographical ele­
ments of his/her own life.
Next, preceded by a discussion of the problem of reductionism, the meth­
odological consequences of such an analysis of religion are described on the 
basis of an interpretive psychological approach, which in turn is based on the 
concept of religion as experience, also including pragmatic aspects of the sub­
ject’s everyday life.
Methodological Consequences for an Interpretative Psychology 
of Religion
The Problem of Reductionism and Possible Solutions
As paradigmatic problems in religious studies, reductionist positions are 
“critical -  distant to claims of validity of religious belief” (Jung, 1999, p. 364; 
trans. MA), while reductionist ways of interpretation and explanation do not 
necessarily depend on personal beliefs of the interpreter. Mircea Eliade (1984, p. 
6) once observed -  referring to Freud and Durkheim -  that the most important 
aspect in the controversial debate on reductionism is this: on the one hand, there 
is the attempt to consider the object of research as a “religious datum”, as a pre- 
interpretative, pre-scientific, or a priori fact; on the other, religious explanations 
and patterns of interpretation are more or less replaced by psychological, socio-
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historical, or theological arguments. Hence, one could ask how reductionist 
argumentation can occur in descriptions and interpretations of experiences.
It is common sense that (religious) phenomena need to be analysed first ‘on 
their plane of reference’. Wayne Proudfoot (1985) also follows this line, being 
critical and sceptical of religion when it comes to a detailed analysis, and con­
fronts reductionism with a differentiation of the ‘descriptive’ and ‘explanatory’ 
aspects of the reductionist problem. First, as a methodological consequence of 
an experience-oriented theoretical approach, it is necessary that ‘descriptions’ 
of an object should be oriented as precisely as possible, and narrowed down as 
much as possible, to the research partners’ understanding of reality. The ver­
ification of such descriptions is then guaranteed if the individual is able to 
recognize and identify himself/herself in the chosen form of articulation and 
expression in his/her first-person relationship with the world. Descriptions 
which do not arise from the horizon of the subject’s experience are excluded, 
resulting perhaps in a misjudgement of the subjective-qualitative moment of the 
individual’s experience. Second, an ‘explanatory reduction’ contains any offer of 
explanation of (religious) experience which is new, typical, and congenic to the 
subjects’ horizon, e. g. from the psychology of religion or sociology. The ex­
planatory content is thematized in a new and different context, and terms and 
patterns of explanations are applied which do not emerge from the experiencing 
subject’s horizon of interpretation, and do not even need to be agreeable or 
consensual (Proudfoot, 1985, p. 197). Thus, in an explanation or interpretation, 
the subject’s everyday world is no longer a normative directional indicator and, 
therefore, its identification in the found explanation, no longer necessary. 
However, deviations between the self-expression of an individual and of a reli­
gious community or even outsiders (non-believers or dissenters) are the normal 
scenario. Descriptions with which an experiencing subject could identify, rec­
ognize, or approve cannot per se be applied to the level of explanation. Ac­
cordingly, scientific statements and explanations about religious life do not 
necessarily require the individual’s consensus to claim validity.
Thus, Jung (1999, p. 358) suggests a threefold differentiation of the problem of 
reductionism: (1) the inner perspective of an experiencing subject, (2) the 
evaluation of alternative explanations of the lived life and (3) the inclusion of 
external explanations. First, in an interpretative analysis, it is of paramount 
importance to assume a subjective form of expression and the pragmatic rela­
tions that are located in the everyday life of a subject.
Second, a “remodalisation of the actual” (Jung, 1999, p. 358; trans. MA) 
makes it possible that in the process of articulation -  whether conscious or not, 
obvious or hidden -  other possible and plausible ways of understanding need 
not be excluded. Furthermore, it becomes possible for an individual to decide on 
a personal perspective from a multitude of different possibilities which are
54 Maik Arnold
plausible for himself/herself and comprehensible to others. This is so because 
the “[k]nowledge of the choice made, as a choice, allows the recognition of 
dissonant choices” (Jung, 1999, p. 359; trans. MA). Thus, a broad spectrum of 
possibilities can be uncovered in which alternative forms of articulation can be 
investigated. Third, interpretative analyses should also include external ex­
planations which do not have to comply with the subjective description of the 
lived experience or the alternative articulation. Objectifications on the basis of 
external explanations, and from the perspective of the third person, must always 
be sought within the horizon of meaning and interpretation of the experiencing 
subject. Finally, on this basis, a comparative approach to an interpretative 
psychology of religion can enrich our discussion and substantiate our methods.
Comparative Analysis in the Cultural Psychology of Religion
A comparative analysis, based on the methodical principles of symbolic action 
theory and cultural psychology, predominantly aids the development and dif­
ferentiation of categories in a systematic comparison of ‘cases’. In the scientific 
process of knowledge-formation, this comparative perspective makes possible 
interpretative analyses and categorisation ofindividual experiences, beliefs, and 
orientations regarding religious phenomena.
Generally, scientific interpretation is here understood as the reflective, pur­
pose-oriented, meaning-anticipating action of a researcher who -  in a meth­
odologically comprehensible and intersubjectively appropriate way -  aims to 
understand the verbally formed, interactively communicated, and ex post facto 
textually fixed part of reality (Straub, 2006, p. 185). An interpretation can itself 
be understood as an approach in which meanings ofexperiences and actions are 
actively and jointly constructed by the researcher and the subject under inves­
tigation. Thus, lived experiences are here analysed as articulated expressions in 
the form of narratives which are adopted in (auto-) biographical constructs via 
verbally communicated practices and textual manifestations, and produced at 
first hand from the perspective of a third person, such as a researcher or in­
terpreter. Descriptions of experiences in stories are thereby not only regarded as 
‘single’ points of a mostly complex life history which have an effect on the 
constitution, development, and transformation of personal identity and self­
concepts, but can also be understood as the existential realization of an in­
dividual in a cultural and religious context. The process of a text interpretation 
consists of essentially three (ideal typical) components. As a matter of course, it 
is permissible, and sometimes necessary, to conduct these sequences in two 
different ways (as a mutually inclusive process of induction and deduction). The 
verbal isolation and separation from the subjectively articulated meaning in­
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creases not only the degree of abstraction, advancing the content of the inter­
pretative explanation, but also leads inevitably to “second-degree-constructs” 
(Schütz, 1962).
The first step aims at “thick descriptions” (cf. Geertz, 1973) of the experi­
encing subject’s inner perspective. According to Bohnsack (2007) and Straub 
(1999), this is a “formulating interpretation”: the interpreter “abstracts from the 
text as little as possible in the attempt of interpretation” (Straub, 1999, p. 213; 
trans. MA), and finds a thematic overview of the sequential structure of a text in 
the form of paraphrases, as well as via finding and indexing (sub-) headings. 
This stage in the procedure aims at a reformulation of what is said, in which no 
new aspects are added. Furthermore, the description of the analysed texts or text 
sequences are oriented as narrowly as possible toward the self-understanding 
and relation of the self to its life world perspective, as well as toward the spaces of 
experience and horizons of expectation of the subject under investigation. The 
degree of detail or selectivity of the paraphrased text sequence is determined by 
the relevance of the sequences to the research question. The purpose of this step 
is to elaborate a descriptive explanation of the phenomenon in question as a 
necessary criterion for the methodological control of all further procedural steps 
in the meaning-making process.
In the second stage of the procedure, a perspectivation of the descriptions 
from the experiencing subject is utilized via identification of possible alternative 
explanations for the lived life. This “remodalisation of the actual” (Jung, 1999, p. 
373) can be understood as a meaningful and thorough weighing of the realistic 
against the realizable interpretations of one’s own life. Questioned, at the same 
time, are which kinds of actions and lived experiences are realized, and which 
other possibilities are negated. Due to the fact that chosen articulations of an 
experiencing subject exclude other possible articulations -  and thus a re­
construction of the conscious or unconscious, obvious or hidden -  articulation 
becomes possible. Deviating or non-approvable positions of descriptions of 
lived experiences remain valid. This act of ‘reformulating interpretation’ starts 
with the perspective of what is said, in compliance with the self-image, and the 
understanding of reality of all research partners. The ‘reciprocation’ of ‘alter­
native choices’ opens up room for articulation, which serves as a starting-point 
for comparisons and subsequent processes of categorisation, although this stage 
in the text interpretation procedure is still not a ‘comparative interpretation’. 
The identification of alternatives usually precedes the comparison and theo­
retical reflections in a structural-logical way.
The third stage in the text interpretation is the pragma-semantic operation, 
“Vergleichen” (Matthes, 1992), in which external explanatory perspectives are 
integrated.
This is the “comparative interpretation” (Straub, 2006) that realizes the as­
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pects of relation, aggregation, and ‘putting-in-relation’ (not necessarily chro­
nologically or argumentatively consecutive) of text segments, patterns of ex­
perience, and their interpretation with a shared content of meaning. As in the 
two previous steps, the meaning ofthe said is reconstructed and reproduced to a 
greater extent: it can be produced intra-textually and inter-textually and as text- 
transcendent, meaning-reconstructive reference (Straub, 2006). Comparisons 
refer to different horizons of comparison, and counter-horizons, such as the 
“interpreter’s knowledge of everyday life”, “explicit empirical substantial 
knowledge”, “scientifically grounded knowledge”, or “imaginations and creative 
meaning-making” (Straub, 1999, p. 225; trans. MA). Owing to the identification, 
assertion, and explanation of these sources of horizons of interpretations, a 
contrastive comparison becomes possible. By means of comparative operation, 
types (or categories) can be determined from the constructions of similarities 
and differences of the characteristics, and singularities of the research object, 
emerging from the horizons of interpretation: e. g. characteristics of people and 
situations, experiences and actions, orientations and beliefs, biographical events 
and processes of development, intentions and motives, as well as possible sub­
differentiations. Depending on the researchers’ verbal articulatory perform­
ances of interpretation, these types may differ and deviate from the values and 
moral orientations of the subjects.
Conclusions
As has been outlined, an interpretative approach to the cultural psychology of 
religion leads to new perspectives for the study of religious life in everyday 
practices. Such a hermeneutical approach, which draws attention to cognitive 
claims on truth, attitudes, beliefs, mental states, emotions, etc., and its practical 
and communicative implications to the individual self in its social environment, 
reminds us of the relevance and importance of a concept of ‘religion as expe­
rience’. Despite some restrictions -  due to the practical implementation of this 
research in overcoming problems of reductionism in explanation and inter­
pretation -  an interpretative cultural psychology of religion (empirically 
grounded on a concept of religion as experience, which also includes pragmatic 
aspects of the subject’s everyday life) reveals a promising perspective. This 
theoretical and methodological framework sensitizes to the complexity and 
diversity of individual religiosity and spirituality. Furthermore, it addresses the 
methodological principles ofa comparative analysis, in the empirical research of 
religion, from a cultural psychological perspective. In this sense, this chapter 
opens the study of articulations of subjective (first-hand) experiences in ev­
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eryday life, and links perspectives of narrative psychology with qualitative social 
research in the psychology of religion.
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